Louis Palme
/
Aug 22, 2007
There used to be a Public Service Announcement on TV that said, “It’s 10 pm. Do you know where your children are?” This ad was appropriate because most of the trouble teenagers would get into would be when they were out with their friends after 10 pm. Responsible parents made it a point to know where their kids were.
Spotting a young man on his way to become an Islamic terrorist may not be quite as easy, but there are some definite signs and indicators that responsible parents should be mindful of. Most American Muslim parents would want to know those indicators, because the last thing in the world they would want for their son would be for him to kill innocent people in an act of jihad. The New York City Police Department just released a comprehensive study of the four stage process which turns unremarkable young men into Islamic terrorists, titled “Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat.” (See www.nyc.gov/html/nypd)
The report used the histories of the perpetrators of eleven Islamic terrorism cases to develop a working model of how the jihadi-Salafi ideology works to move young men (18 to 30 years old) through four definite stages – pre-radicalization, self-identification, indoctrination, and jihadization. While it is possible for some people to enter into this process and then exit before actually performing criminal act, the report concludes, “Individuals who pass through this entire process are quite likely to be involved in the planning or implementation of a terrorist act. “ (pg. 6)
The study also came to some interesting general conclusions: the September 11, 2001, attack was exceptional in that it involved a foreign cell attacking another foreign country—most terrorist cells are autonomous and homegrown; race is not a determining factor, as perpetrators were Middle Eastern, African, South Asian, Asian, and even Caucasian in some cases; terrorists usually do not come from criminal backgrounds; poverty and oppression are not motivating factors but rather ideology seems to be the driver; and by the time the men actually perform a terrorist act they have usually withdrawn from not only their family ties but also from their local mosque (for reasons that will be explained later).
Jihadi-Salafi Ideology
To better understand the ideological element of the radicalization, the following statements are direct quotes from the NYPD report:
· Jihadi-Salafi ideology is but one stream of the broader Salafi movement. The general goal of this Sunni revivalist interpretation of Islam is to create a “pure’ society that applies a literal reading to the Quran and adheres to the social practices that prevailed at the time of 7th Century Arabia.
· Implementation of Sharia law and replacement of the system of nation states with a worldwide Caliphate are the ultimate political aims.
· Contemporary Saudi (Wahhabi) scholars have provide religious legitimacy for many of the arguments promoted by the jihadists.
· Increasingly, Salafi Non-Governmental Organizations are proliferating this militant ideology by distributing literature from Salafi ideologues such as Sayyid Qutb, Sayyid Mawdudi, and Hassan al-Banna.
· Extremists have used [Muslim Student Associations] as forums for the development and recruitment of like-minded individuals – providing a receptive platform for younger, American-born imams, to present a radical message in a way that resonates with the students. For example, one book increasingly being cited for discussion by many of these associations is Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab’s Kitab At-Tawheed, the foundational book for Wahhabi Islam.
· Extreme intolerance and hostility towards unbelievers, including Jews, Christians, Hindus and Shiites, is a core doctrine provided by Wahhabi religious thought.
· The political aspect of jihadi-Salafi ideology is heavily underpinned by the work of Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian author, Islamist, and the leading intellectual of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950’s and 1960’s. He believed that Islam was under attack from the West and divided the world into the Muslim and the non-Muslim. To Qutb, democracy challenged the sovereignty of God’s divine law and should be resisted. Moreover, he also contended that militant jihad had to be used to attack institutions and societies in order to overthrow non-Islamic governments and to bring about a “pure” Islamic society.
· The personal search for one’s own Muslim identity often dovetails with the desire to find an appropriate Islamic response to the political crises involving Muslims worldwide. Complex disputes like the Arab-Israeli conflict and Kashmir are diluted into one large conflict between “believers” and “non-believers.” This powerful and simple “one-size fits all” philosophy resonates with the younger diaspora Muslim populations in the West who are often politically naïve.
· The jihadi-Salafi interpretation paves a path to terrorism by its doctrines, which suggest that violence is a viable and legitimate means to defend Islam from perceived enemies, even if it means attacking one’s own government and/or sacrificing your own life.
Islamic Terrorist Case Studies
The eleven Islamic terrorist case studies are described briefly below:
1. Al-Qaeda attack of September 11, 2001 – Nineteen terrorists from Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Egypt with the leaders/pilots coming together in Hamburg, Germany, caused the death of nearly 3,000 people in a suicide attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
2. Madrid March, 2004, commuter train attack – Twenty-nine terrorists are charged with killing 191 people and injuring and additional 2,050.
3. Amsterdam (Hofstad Group) – Four terrorists planned to attack the Dutch Parliament, the national airport, and a nuclear reactor. The group was exposed and apprehended in November, 2004, after the leader Mohammad Bouyeri attacked and killed Theo Van Gough in broad daylight, nearly decapitating him, execution style.
4. London Underground and bus attack of July, 2005 – Four suicide bombers carried out a coordinated attack that killed 52 commuters and injured 700 people.
5. Australia’s Operation Pendennis which thwarted seventeen Islamic terrorists in November , 2005, who planned to attack the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Immigration, the Sydney Opera House, and the Sydney Harbor Bridge. They were arrested with several hundred pounds of lethal chemicals, bomb making manuals, 165 detonators, 132 digital timers, firearms, and ammunition.
6. The Toronto 18 Case included one member who traveled to Pakistan supposedly for paramilitary training. The group did military exercises and shooting practice in remote areas dressed in camouflage. Their planned targets included the Canadian Security Intelligence Services office, the Toronto Stock Exchange, and the Canadian Parliament Building. They were arrested in June, 2006, after trying to purchase three tons of ammonium nitrate for $4,000.
7. The Lackawana Six of New York – A group of eight Yemeni-Americans who trained for terrorism at an al-Qaeda camp in Afghanistan prior to 9/11. Although the group began to break up before planning an actual terrorist attack, they were arrested in September, 2002. Six were later charged with supporting a terrorist organization.
8. The Portland Seven of Oregon – A group of eight mostly American-born Muslims who attempted to join al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan immediately following 9/11. Six were arrested in 2002 on their return to the U.S.; one was killed by Pakistani forces in 2003.
9. The Virginia Paintball Jihadis – Eleven diverse Muslims whose members traveled to Pakistan, purchased semi-automatic weapons, and trained for fighting using paint ball weapons. Eight were arrested in June, 2003, after an unsuccessful attempt to join al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan via Pakistan and China.
10. Herald Square Subway Plotters of New York City – Shahawar Matin Siraj, a 23 year-old Pakistani illegal immigrant and James Elshafay an Egyptian-Irish who embraced radical Islam after a trip to Egypt in 2002 at age 17. The two planned to blow up the busy Herald Square subway station, and they even rehearsed the attack leaving back-packs filled with clothes. This station was a block away from Madison Square Garden where the Republican National Convention was being held that month. They were arrested in August, 2004.
11. The Al Muhajiroun Two of New York City -- Two Pakistani-born Muslims who grew up in New York. Their list of charges included delivering military equipment and funds to radical Islamists in Pakistan and Afghanistan, providing assistance and training to al-Qaeda terrorists, and assisting in two assassination attempts on Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf. They were arrested in April, 2004, and June, 2006.
The Radicalization Process
In the description of the radicalization process based on the NYPD report, the importance of each element is given a score – 11 being common to all of the terrorism cases studied, to 1 being found in only one instance. As parents of young men, the more elements that you associate with your son the more at risk he may be. The a higher score for a particular element indicates that it is more of a determining factor, as compared with an element with a lower score. A detailed score box, “Common Elements of Radicalization Process,” is provided in a table at the end of the discussion.
There are two caveats with the data below: A score of 1 was given for any terrorism case that had one or more members involved in the criteria listed below. Some elements were not scored simply because there was no information on that point in the case studies used.
Stage 1: PRE-RADICALIZATION – The individual’s world in terms of social, religious, and educational background prior to the start of the journey down the path to radicalization
· Male from fifteen to thirty-five years old Score: 11
· Second or third generation of immigrant family Score: 6
· Middle class, educated Score: 8
· New convert to Islam (or newly rediscovered faith) Score: 10
· Upward and geographically mobile Score: 6
Stage 2: SELF-IDENTIFICATION – The stage where the individual begins to explore Salafi Islam and redefine himself in terms of Salafi philosophy, ideology, and values
· Personal crisis (including family event, economic setback, social alienation, new political awareness) Score: 8
· Gravitation toward Salafi/Wahhabi interpretations of Islam Score: 11
· Increased focus on internet Islamist sites, literature, video tapes, and other media Score: 10
· Increased interest in foreign conflicts involving Muslims Score: 9
· Changing social associations from family to small group of like-minded Muslims Score: 11
· Modeling Salafi behavior – wearing traditional Islamic clothing; growing beard; giving up cigarettes, drinking, and socializing with non-Muslims; becoming newly active in Islamic community affairs Score: 6
Stage 3: INDOCTRINATION – The stage where the individual progressively intensifies his beliefs, wholly adopts the jihadi-Salafi ideology, and concludes that circumstances exist to engage in militant jihad
· Close alignment or loyalty to a “spiritual sanctioner” a mentor who reinforces jihadi-Salafi values Score: 10
· Withdrawal from the mosque – because mosque is too tolerant or to avoid being detected by infiltrators who may be observing newly radicalized worshipers Score: 8
· Politicization of new beliefs – seeing world as divided between believers and unbelievers Score: 6
· Increased frequency of meetings with small group of like-minded extremists Score: 9
Stage 4: JIHADIZATION – The stage where the individual accepts his personal duty to participate in jihad and self-designates himself as a holy warrior or majahedeen
· Travel to foreign country for paramilitary training or religious studies Score: 11
· Involvement in paramilitary exercises, including retreats, gun practices, and “outward bound”-type group bonding experiences Score: 7
· Planning attack, reconnaissance, researching methods for making weapons, acquiring weapons or bomb materials Score: 8
COMMON ELEMENTS OF RADICALIZATION PROCESS
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PRE-RADICALIZATION |
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MALE, AGE 15-35 |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
11 |
2ND OR 3RD GENERATION
IMMIGRANT |
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X |
X |
X |
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X |
X |
X |
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6 |
MIDDLE CLASS, EDUCATED |
X |
X |
X |
X |
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X |
X |
X |
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X |
8 |
NEW CONVERT OR NEWLY
REDISCOVERED FAITH |
X |
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X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
10 |
UPWARD AND GEOGRAPHICALLY
MOBILE |
X |
X |
X |
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X |
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X |
X |
6 |
SELF-IDENTIFICATION |
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PERSONAL CRISIS |
X |
X |
X |
X |
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X |
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X |
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X |
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7 |
GRAVITATION TO
SALAFI/WAHHABI ISLAM |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
11 |
FOCUS ON ISLAMIST INTERNET,
LITERATURE, AND VIDEOS |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
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X |
X |
X |
10 |
INTEREST IN FOREIGN
CONFLICTS INVOLVING
MUSLIMS |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
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X |
|
X |
9 |
CHANGING SOCIAL
ASSOCIATIONS TO LIKE-
MINDED MUSLIMS |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
11 |
MODELING SALAFI BEHAVIOR |
X |
X |
X |
X |
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X |
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X |
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6 |
INDOCTRINATION |
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CLOSE ALIGNMENT WITH
“SPIRITUAL SANCTIONER” |
X |
X |
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X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
10 |
WITHDRAWAL FROM MOSQUE |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
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X |
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8 |
POLITIZATION OF NEW BELIEFS |
X |
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X |
X |
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X |
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X |
X |
6 |
INCREASED FREQUENCY OF
SMALL GROUP MEETINGS |
X |
X |
X |
X |
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X |
X |
X |
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X |
X |
9 |
JIHADIZATION |
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TRAVEL TO FOREIGN COUNTRY |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
11 |
PARAMILITARY EXERCISES |
X |
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X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
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7 |
PLANNING AND PREPARATION
FOR ATTACK |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
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|
X |
X |
8 |
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